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MICKEY GOES TO FRANCE: A CASE STUDY
OF THE EURO DISNEYLAND NEGOTIATIONS
Lauren A. Newell*
In 1984, The Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) was riding the
wave of success from its newest Resort,1 Tokyo Disney Resort
(“Tokyo Disney”),2 which attracted 10 million guests3 in the first
year alone,4 and its thoughts turned to further international expansion—this time, in Europe. After careful consideration of potential locations and preliminary negotiations with two European
governments,5 Disney decided in 1984 to launch Euro Disneyland
(“Euro Disneyland” or “EDL”)6 in Marne-la-Vallée, France. The
realities of opening and operating EDL in France were far different than Disney’s expectations when it began negotiations—so
much so that the Resort narrowly escaped bankruptcy.7 For an
“entertainment empire”8 like Disney, this was an unprecedented
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Pettit College of Law; B.A., Georgetown University, 2004; J.D., Harvard Law School 2007.
1 As used herein, “Resort” refers to a Disney resort property, consisting of (unless otherwise indicated), Parks, hotels, all entertainment facilities, and the transportation systems that
connect them. “Park” refers to a Disney theme park, including (unless otherwise indicated) the
park grounds, rides, and attractions, and surrounding resorts, hotels, and other Disney-affiliated
entertainment facilities.
2 Tokyo Disney was Disney’s third Park and first international venture, located in Tokyo,
Japan. See The Walt Disney Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 11–12 (Nov. 21, 2012) [hereinafter Annual Report].
3 Disney refers to Resort visitors and patrons as “guests.” This terminology derives from
Walt Disney, who, at the opening of Disneyland Resort (“Disneyland”), established the motto
“At Disneyland, the visitors are our guests.” BILL CAPODAGLI & LYNN JACKSON, THE DISNEY
WAY: HARNESSING THE MANAGEMENT SECRETS OF DISNEY IN YOUR COMPANY 59 (1999) (internal quotation omitted). Disneyland was Disney’s first resort property, located in Anaheim,
California. See Annual Report, supra note 2, at 9.
4 MICHAEL EISNER WITH TONY SCHWARTZ, WORK IN PROGRESS: RISKING FAILURE, SURVIVING SUCCESS 263 (1998).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 19–28.
6 Euro Disneyland was Disney’s fourth Resort. See Annual Report, supra note 2, at 8–12.
On October 1, 1994, the Resort’s name was officially changed from Euro Disneyland to Disneyland Paris. About Our Company: Our Story, DISNEYLAND PARIS, http://corporate.disneyland
paris.com/about-our-company/our-story/ (last visited July 10, 2012). In March 2002, the Resort’s
name was officially changed again to Disneyland Resort Paris. Id.
7 See infra text accompanying note 56.
8 E.g., The Mouse Besieged, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at A36 (referring to Disney’s “fabled entertainment empire”); Jason Garcia, Disney Banking on a New Princess, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 12, 2009, at A1 (referring to “Disney’s entertainment empire”). This is
an apt characterization, given the fact that Disney had $42.3 billion in revenue in 2012, and has
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194 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 15:193
failure. This Article presents a case study of Disney’s interactions
with the French government and citizens through Euro Disneyland,
and analyzes its mistakes and attempts to rectify them in the context of intercultural negotiation9 theory. It concludes with advice
for how multinational firms like Disney should approach international deal-making in the future to avoid repeating past mistakes.

I.

FOUNDATION OF A DEAL: THE IMPORTANCE
CULTURE IN NEGOTIATION

OF

Culture10 is significant in business negotiations for the simple
reason that all negotiators necessarily bring their own cultural
backgrounds to the table—cultural values influence negotiators’ interests and priorities.11 Negotiation strategies that conceptually accord with a culture’s values become normative in that culture, such
that negotiators from that culture unconsciously adopt those behaviors.12 If viewed by members of other cultural groups as inapdiversified business segments that include parks and resorts, media networks, consumer products, studio entertainment, and interactive media. See Annual Report, supra note 2, at 1–16, 28.
In addition, Disney currently owns, operates, manages, and/or licenses, directly or indirectly, six
resort properties in California, Florida, Japan, France, Hong Kong, and Hawaii, with a seventh
resort property in China currently under construction. Id. at 8–12. Disney also operates other
resort and vacation facilities, including through a cruise line, a vacation ownership plan, and a
provider of guided vacation tour packages. Id. at 12.
9 As used in this Article, “negotiation” refers to all “back-and-forth communication designed to reach an agreement when [the parties] have some interests that are shared and others
that are opposed.” ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN xvii (2d ed. 1991). This broad definition encompasses most interpersonal interactions.
10 As used in this Article, “culture” refers to “a set of shared and enduring meanings, values,
and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior.” Guy
Olivier Faure & Gunnar Sjöstedt, Culture and Negotiation: An Introduction, in CULTURE AND
NEGOTIATION: THE RESOLUTION OF WATER DISPUTES 3 (Guy Olivier Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin,
eds., 1993) (emphasis omitted). The “other groups” contemplated by this definition include organizations such as Disney, which have their own “organizational cultures.” Wanis-St. John defines “organizational cultures” as “ ‘shared mental models that the members of an organization
hold and take for granted’ and that facilitate its success.” Anthony Wanis-St. John, Cultural
Pathways in Negotiation and Conflict Management, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
119–120 (Michael L. Moffit & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2005), (quoting EDGAR SCHEIN, CORPORATE CULTURE SURVIVAL GUIDE 20 (1st ed. 1999)). This Article’s use of “culture” refers primarily to national cultures and business cultures.
11 JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO NEGOTIATE DEALS, RESOLVE
DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 7 (2001).
12 See Catherine H. Tinsley & Madan M. Pillutla, Negotiating in the United States and Hong
Kong, 29 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 711, 713, 715 (1998).
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propriate or offensive, the culturally-shaped strategies create and
perpetuate discord in cross-cultural negotiations.13
II.

THE DEAL: MICKEY GOES

TO

FRANCE

The original concept for Euro Disneyland was Walt Disney’s.14
He desired to pay tribute to France by building a Resort there because France’s gardens and castles had inspired his design of Disneyland in Anaheim, California.15 Disney also wanted to honor his
ancestral connections to France and to celebrate the memories of
his time there as an ambulance driver during World War I.16 Disney executives first researched the idea of a European Resort in
earnest after Tokyo’s warm embrace of Tokyo Disney, and two
separate groups of executives formally pitched the concept to Disney CEO Michael Eisner and president Frank Wells in the early
1980s.17 Aware that Europeans accounted for more than two million of the domestic Resorts’ annual visits, Eisner and Wells authorized a search for the perfect European site.18 In the fall of
1984, Dick Nunis, head of Disney’s domestic Resorts, and Jim
Cora, head of construction at Tokyo Disney, presented to Eisner
and Wells the result of more than 1,200 site evaluations—the viable
options were France and Spain.19 Nunis and Cora favored Spain
for the weather, but noted the site lacked reliable phone service
and was a considerable distance from central Europe, which meant
a Spanish Resort would likely attract only summer tourists. In contrast, while the agrarian French site initially seemed unimpressive,20 its proximity to downtown Paris and, perhaps more
importantly, Eisner’s fond childhood memories of France made a
French Resort more favorable.21 Eisner knew that Paris com13

See id. at 715.
ANDREW LAINSBURY, ONCE UPON AN AMERICAN DREAM: THE STORY OF EURO DISNEYLAND 16–17 (2000). Walt Disney was Disney’s founder and the creative force behind the
Resorts.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 EISNER, supra note 4, at 262.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 264.
20 Id. at 264.
21 Id. at 265. Eisner’s great influence over Disney during his term as its CEO makes the fact
that he favored France especially significant. See Kathryn Harris, The Loneliest Man in the
Kingdom: Forget Walt. Michael Eisner, Disney’s Hands-on Chairman, is Shaping the Company
in His Own Image, Signing off on Everything from Scripts to Carpet Patterns. But in Today’s
14
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196 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 15:193
manded steady tourism (between 12 and 16 million tourists annually in the 1980s).22 Moreover, Ile-de-France (the Paris metro area
under consideration) was zoned such that the French government,
rather than a mayoral commune, controlled it.23 Eisner also assumed the French climate would not diminish the prospective Resort’s success; he surmised that the French were used to bad
weather and that tourists would continue to visit France despite its
climate.24 Though Eisner was partial to France, he and Wells instructed Nunis and Cora to negotiate with both sides and see what
terms they would offer.
The French and Spanish governments quickly launched a bidding war for Disney’s patronage. Beyond mere bragging rights, a
Disney Resort promised the host country thousands of jobs and
billions of revenue from the projected millions of annual tourist
visits.25 Neither government wanted to lose the lucrative project,
and they both wooed Disney with financing deals, tax breaks, and
even offers of free land.26 As the Spanish minister of tourism and
transport remarked in September of 1985, “We want to obtain Disneyland at any price!”27 The Disney negotiators sat back and allowed the governments to raise the stakes. Ultimately, France’s
offer proved unbeatable. Eisner made the announcement during a
meeting with representatives of the French government in December 1985 that Disney would build in France.28

World of Corporate Mergers and Alliances, Can Mickey’s Competitive, Go-it-Alone Boss Keep
Winning?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at 14 (describing Eisner as Disney’s “ultimate arbiter of
taste”).
22 EISNER, supra note 4, at 265.
23 Richard F. Babcock, Mickey a la Mode, 57 PLANNING 18,19–20 (1991). France’s 1982 devolution law changed zoning, resulting in a nationwide system of municipally-controlled communes. Id. The central government’s control over the proposed Disney site decreased the
likelihood of harassment from the local municipality. See id.
24 EISNER, supra note 4, at 265. A native of New York, a city that “barely notices” inclement
weather, Eisner attributed the climate concern to “people who’d lived in California for most of
their lives,” and did not find the objection personally “compelling.” Id.
25 See Steven Greenhouse, Playing Disney in the Parisian Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991,
at C3. Christian Cardon, head of the French government office established to coordinate
France’s negotiations with Disney, predicted “Euro Disney is going to create at least 30,000
jobs. . . . And tourists from abroad will spend almost $1 billion a year here” (internal quotation
omitted). Id.
26 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 21.
27 Id. at 20 (internal quotation omitted).
28 Gail DeGeorge & Andres Oppenheimer, Vive Mickey! France Snares a Disney Park,
MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 19, 1985, at 1A.
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Disney planned to open the Resort in April of 1992.29 Future
expansion aside, Euro Disneyland would boast twenty-nine attractions, six hotels, a 190,000 square foot entertainment center, a
campground, and a twenty-seven hole golf course surrounded by
one-family homes.30 Disney anticipated serving 15–17,000 meals
per hour, excluding snacks,31 in Disneyland Park’s32 combined seventy restaurants, eateries, food carts, and cafeterias, and projected
receiving more than 11 million visitors in the first year.33 Disney’s
main goals were to control its financial exposure, as it did in Tokyo,
but also to obtain a substantial share of profits and management
control, which it failed to do in Japan.34 In what was regarded as a
mistake, given Tokyo Disney’s success, Disney relinquished ownership of that Resort and licensed it to the Japanese in exchange for
royalties.35 Disney was determined not to miss a similarly profitable opportunity in France by foregoing ownership, and so it
charged Joe Shapiro, Disney’s corporate counsel and lead negotiator in Paris, with securing a deal that gave Disney both ownership
and control of EDL. Shapiro negotiated simultaneously with more
than six French agencies. He reported primarily to Wells, who
called at all hours of the day and night with new demands.36
Through Shapiro’s efforts, the parties agreed to Disney’s forming a
wholly owned French corporation, Euro Disney S.C.A. (“Euro
Disney”), that would own and operate EDL. Thanks to a loophole
that allowed Disney to sell 51% of Euro Disney shares to the public and still retain management control, as well as to receive royalties from gross revenues, Disney overcame France’s legal
29

Euro Disneyland Financing Gains, N. Y. TIMES, July 8, 1988, at D12.

30

Joan Bakos, Allons Enfant au Euro Disneyland!, 90 RESTAURANT BUS. 96, 98 (1991).

31

Id. at 98.

32

Disneyland Park is one of two Parks at EDL, and is comparable to Magic Kingdom Park
(“Magic Kingdom”) at Walt Disney World Resort (“Walt Disney World”), Disney’s second Resort, located in Lake Buena Vista, Florida. See generally Disneyland Park, DISNEYLAND PARIS,
http://us.parks.disneylandparis.com/disneyland-park/index.xhtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). See
generally also Magic Kingdom Park, WALT DISNEY WORLD, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/
destinations/magic-kingdom/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Magic Kingdom]. Disneyland Park consists of five themed “Lands”: Main Street, USA, Frontierland, Fantasyland, Adventureland, and Discoveryland. See generally Disneyland Park: Lands, DISNEYLAND PARIS,
http://us.parks.disneylandparis.com/disneyland-park/lands/index.xhtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
33

Greenhouse, supra note 25, at C3.

34

EISNER, supra note 4, at 266.

35

See id. at 263.

36

See id. at 268. See also JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR 86–87 (2003)
(having to negotiate simultaneously on home time and local time is one of the perils of international deal-making).
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prohibition against foreign investors’ holding more than 49% interests in French companies.37
Just before the parties signed the contract, Prime Minister
Fabius and the Socialist party were voted out of office, and were
replaced by Jacques Chirac and the Conservatives.38 The new government was sympathetic to the Disney project (due partly to the
personal relationship Eisner cultivated with Chirac),39 but the
change in power meant that Disney had to start negotiating almost
from scratch.40 The final deal that Eisner and Chirac signed on
March 24, 1987 gave Disney 4,400 acres of Marne-la-Vallée land at
a bargain price,41 a $700 million French government loan at belowmarket interest rates, $400 million of financing of key infrastructure, France’s promise to construct a TGV stop at the Resort’s
front entrance and to expand the A-4 freeway, and other valuable
benefits.42 Disney would pay only 26% of the contract’s total
cost,43 and so could profit from EDL even if EDL lost money.44
Also important to the American company, France agreed to accept
Walt Disney’s claim of French ancestry.45 Eighty-five percent of
the French population supported the deal, despite the fact that
their taxes paid for much of it.46 And not surprisingly, Disney was

37 In 1988, French President Mitterrand declared an end to nationalizations; companies
could acquire up to 49% private capital. Allowing privatization was intended to bring in billions
of francs, which were to be spent on public housing and repaying public debt. See COLIN
GORDON, THE BUSINESS CULTURE IN FRANCE 9 (1996). Disney’s loophole was a law that allowed majority shareholders to be overruled in certain circumstances of ownership. Its effect
was providing Disney with 100% control of Euro Disney, despite its holding only a 49% interest.
See LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 30.
38 Paul Lewis, A French Disneyland Near Paris is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1987, at
A16.
39 See EISNER, supra note 4, at 268.
40 Lewis, supra note 38, at A16.
41 Declaring the Disney development a “project of general interest,” the French government
exercised its eminent domain powers to freeze the land’s value at its agricultural price. Babcock,
supra note 23, at 20 (internal quotation omitted). The sale of productive farmland at belowmarket prices triggered protests by French farmers, who were aware that property values surrounding Disney sites had risen 20% in 25 years in California, 30% per year in Florida, and
faster in Tokyo than those of any other piece of Japanese land. Id.
42 See EISNER, supra note 4, at 265–266; LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 31–32.
43 Paul R. Michaud, Going Global: Wild Kingdom, 5 WORLD TRADE, no. 8, Oct. 1992 at *1.
44 See The Not-So-Magic Kingdom: Euro Disney, THE ECONOMIST (US), Sept. 26, 1992, at
87.
45 Roger Mills, James Dimech Debono & Victoria Dimech Debono, Euro Disney: A Mickey
Mouse Project?, 12 EUR. MGMT. J. 306, 307 (1994).
46 Id. This figure was based on a poll conducted in 1987. Id.
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thrilled with the bargain, which one Disney official called “the deal
of the century.”47
Euro Disney’s very successful October 9, 1989 IPO was oversubscribed at a high share price. Like Tokyo Disney, Euro Disneyland was expected to be an instant success.48 As Euro Disney
president Robert Fitzpatrick commented, “My biggest fear . . . is
that we will be too successful.”49 The financial community agreed:
Margo Vignola of Salomon Brothers opined, “I don’t think it can
miss. . . . They [Disney] are masters of marketing. When the place
opens, it will be perfect. And they know how to make people
smile—even the French.”50 Disney was entirely confident that it
had just negotiated its next great financial victory.
Despite this optimism, Euro Disney faced challenges that
likely would have crippled another company. Protests over alleged
contractual irregularities by sixteen construction firms threatened
to block the grand opening.51 Disney negotiated around this
threat, but could not prevent the rail strike, bombing of a power
pylon, and damp, chilly weather that marred the Resort’s first day,
or stop the French farmers who blockaded the Resort’s entrance
with their tractors a few months later while protesting American
agricultural trade policies.52 The first summer, typically the peak
period for Disney visits, attracted a disappointing 30,000 tourists
per day, with particularly low numbers of French guests.53 The Resort ran at a net Ffr339 million (approximately 51.7 million euro)
47

Michaud, supra note 43, at *1 (internal quotation omitted).
See Greenhouse, supra note 25, at C3. This confidence was based partly on the fact that
Europeans accounted for over 2.7 million visits to Disney’s American Parks in 1990 and spent
$1.6 billion on Disney merchandise. Id. Disney expected high attendance levels because the
Disney name and quality of experience would make the Resort a popular vacation destination,
because the Resort was easily accessible to more than 310 million people due to its central location and proximity to airports, trains, and highways, and because Disney’s prices were comparable to those of Paris’s major attractions with similar entertainment value. Mills, Debono &
Debono, supra note 45, at 308.
49 Greenhouse, supra note 25, at C3. In preparation for this possibility, Disney made plans
for emergency radio and subway announcements to warn people that Disneyland Park was full.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
50 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
51 Vicki Vaughan, Euro Disney Ironing Out Wrinkles: A French Labor Leader and 16 Construction Companies Working on the Theme Park Blast the Company’s Way of Doing Business,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 9, 1992, at D1.
52 See Vicki Vaughan, Bonjour, Mickey Mouse—Euro Disney Opens, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Apr. 13, 1992, at A1; E. Tempest, Protestors Block Euro Disneyland France: Irked by U.S. Trade
Policies, Farmers use Tractors to Keep Cars and Buses out of the Park, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1992,
at 8. See also supra note 41 and infra note 88.
53 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 308.
48
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operating loss after the first six months of operations.54 Euro Disney ran out of cash in 1993 and had to request emergency funds
from Disney. Only a renegotiation of Euro Disney’s interest payments and fees in 199355 and a significant investment from Prince
Al-Waleed Bin Tahal, who offered to buy up to 24.5% of Euro
Disney, saved Euro Disney from a humiliating bankruptcy.56 Ironically, the Resort that was declared a success even before it was
built did not earn a net profit until 1995.57 Though Disney satisfied
all its interests in negotiating the EDL agreement, it overlooked
one crucial truth: Even the best financial deal would fail if no one
came to the Resort.

III.

THE ANALYSIS: WHY

THE

EMPIRE PROVED FALLIBLE

Disney’s opening and operating Euro Disneyland involved negotiations in three significant contexts: with the French government
to finance the Resort, with construction firms and intraorganizational employees to construct and operate the Resort, and with
tourists to sell the Resort and make it a success. Part III analyzes
Disney’s achievements and errors in conducting the various negotiations in light of negotiation theory regarding international dealmaking in general, and French-American negotiations in particular.58 It then addresses Disney’s attempt to “renegotiate” by correcting its prior mistakes. It becomes clear that throughout the
Euro Disneyland negotiations, Disney was guilty both of arrogance
and of poor prioritization: Assuming it could not fail, Disney focused on the money and lost sight of the people behind it.
54

Id. at 309.
See id. at 312.
56 See LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 140, 153.
57 The Kingdom Inside the Republic (New Management Strategy at Euro Disney), THE ECONOMIST (US), Apr. 13, 1996, at 66.
58 The negotiations in opening and operating EDL took place with construction firms, employees, and tourists from many countries other than France as well. However, as France was
the host country and the majority of interactions were between French and Americans, this
Article focuses on negotiations between these two countries. It should also be noted that references to behaviors, traits, or attitudes “typical” to one culture are made with recognition that
such generalizations are inapplicable on the individual level. See, e.g., Kwok Leung, Rabi S.
Bhagat, Nancy R. Buchan, Miriam Erez & Cristina B. Gibson, Culture and International Business: Recent Advances and Their Implications for Future Research, 36 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 357,
368–370 (Jul. 2005). Characterizations of “French” and “American” negotiators are intended to
be read with that limitation in mind.
55
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Negotiations with the Government

Disney’s negotiation with the French government was arguably its most successful one, insofar as the resulting deal met Disney’s interests. Much of Disney’s success with the French
government is attributable to Disney’s understanding its negotiation partner. In business deals such as this one, the state’s main
goals are typically social or political, as Government officials have
strong interests in maintaining their power and are likely to focus
on short-term gains that will get them reelected.59 Thus, understanding the local government’s ideology, including its perception
of private investment, profit, and individual rights, is a crucial aspect of the negotiations for a company in Disney’s position.60 Disney had a strong sense of the French government’s interests in this
negotiation—Disney had watched the two governments fight over
the chance to host EDL, so its executives were well aware that the
French government primarily welcomed a Disney Resort as a solution to the unemployment problem and a boost to tourism, rather
than out of concern for Disney shareholders’ profits.61
Along with understanding governmental interests, international dealmakers must also recognize the true role government
plays in the host country.62 Mayors of French communes are important officials with few checks on their power.63 Because it was
aware of the mayors’ power, Disney negotiated directly with the
national government to obtain state-controlled land, thereby
bypassing the local authorities and mitigating the risk of harassment on the local level.64 Circumventing the municipal government helped to assure Disney that a Marne Valley mayor would
not repudiate the negotiated deal if the terms later proved unfavorable to the French interests.65
59 BRETT, supra note 11, at 179. In this case, French Socialists argued vehemently that
French money should be devoted to housing and immediate economic needs instead of to lending Disney 40% of the EDL project costs. Id. at 192. Presumably, ten thousand new jobs and
billions of tourism revenue were enough incentive for French officials to proceed despite the
Socialist outcry.
60 Id. at 179.
61 To ensure these interests were met, the French insisted that Disney build a French tourism
office in Disneyland Park. Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
62 See Christophe Dupont, International Business Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: ANALYSIS, APPROACHES, ISSUES 375, 381–382 (Victor A Kremenyuk ed., 2002).
63 GORDON, supra note 37, at 162.
64 See infra text accompanying note 85.
65 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 179-180 (explaining that risk of repudiation by the government of burdensome contracts in the name of sovereignty and public welfare is one source of
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The process of negotiating with the various government agencies was itself a vast undertaking. Shapiro compared it to:
[C]oming to the United States and trying to make a deal with
the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Transportation; and it also
has to be approved by the House and the Senate. Then you
have to make a deal with the governor of California, the county
of Los Angeles, the city of Los Angeles, the Burbank Redevelopment Agency, and you have to go to the Southern California
rapid transit people.66

Complex negotiations such as the EDL deal underscore the necessity of studying the host government’s bureaucratic structure—
whether it makes or only implements policy decisions, how bureaucrats get jobs, whether there is a climate of corruption, etc.67 Presumably aware of all of these challenges and issues, Disney
convinced France to name a full-time ministerial level official to
coordinate Euro Disney’s relations with the French government
and to avoid bureaucratic red tape.68 The use of such a mediator to
facilitate the business relationship between government and private firm is recognized as a successful deal-making strategy,69 and
it served Disney well by streamlining the negotiation process.
Disney also wisely acknowledged the possibility that the EDL
deal could result in disputes with the French government. Thus,
Shapiro was relentless in negotiating an arbitration provision that
would settle disputes at the International Chamber of Commerce,
rather than in French court.70 Agreement upon governing law is
essential in international negotiations; commercial arbitration provisions provide the additional benefits of assuring neutrality, avoiding costly litigation, and maintaining privacy.71 Disney’s insistence
upon arbitration was a prudent strategy to reduce its risk in dealing
with the French government.

instability inherent in international deal-making, as is the risk that the government may invoke
sovereign immunity). In light of these possibilities, Disney’s precautions appear especially
prudent.
66 BRETT, supra note 11, at 191.
67 Id. at 192.
68 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1. The minister’s appointment was a product of negotiations
with Chirac. See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
69 SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 25.
70 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
71 SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 68.
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Disney also coped well with a risk present in all international
business deals: government regime change.72 Chirac’s assumption
of control over the French government two days before France
signed the contract with Disney could have toppled the deal, except that Disney prepared for the potential regime change in several ways. Negotiators met with Chirac as soon as it seemed that
Fabius would not remain in power, and secured Chirac’s promise
that if he were elected his government would continue working
with Disney.73 Chirac even agreed to reduce bureaucratic barriers
by appointing the aforementioned government minister.74 Disney’s circumvention of the potential problems caused by a government regime change is largely attributable to the fact that the
American negotiators adopted the French norm of relationship
building in the pre-negotiation stage—France is considered a
highly affective,75 “high-context” culture,76 such that establishing a
personal relationship between the parties is a necessary precondition to substantive agreement. Thus, Eisner’s personal relationship
with Chirac77 likely contributed a great deal to Chirac’s willingness
to work with Disney.
Though the final deal met Disney’s financial interests, negotiations with the French government were hardly idyllic. For instance,
the government demanded that Disney retitle Disneyland Park’s
attractions with French names.78 This demand was arguably attributable to an attempt by the government to preserve the integrity of
the French language, a mission that France conducts through its
French Academy, which endeavors to prevent French’s incorpora-

72

See id. at 179–180.
LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 27.
74 Id.; see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
75 Jennifer M. George, Gareth R. Jones & Jorge A. Gonzalez, The Role of Affect in CrossCultural Negotiations, 29 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 749, 757 (1998). Members of “highly affective”
cultures tend to display a great deal of emotional expression. Id.
76 BRETT, supra note 11, at 20. “High-context” cultures typically prefer indirect, nuanced,
and inferential communications, and their negotiations depend upon close personal relationships
and well-developed communication networks. Id. at 20–21. American culture is considered
“low-context,” meaning Americans prefer direct communication of explicit information. Id. In
contrast with Disney’s conduct here, Americans tend to approach negotiation as a problem solving process and to emphasize results rather than relationships, and so they typically devote little
time to fostering interpersonal connections. See RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 36–37 (rev. ed.
1997).
77 See supra text accompanying note 39.
78 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
73
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tion of foreign words.79 Disney agreed to some name changes (for
example, renaming the Magic Kingdom’s Swiss Family Treehouse80
“La Cabane des Robinson”), but held firm on others (such as Main
Street, U.S.A. and Big Thunder Mountain Railroad81).82 This conflict demonstrates the hazard of ethnocentric thinking, which pervades international deal-making—negotiators tend to perceive
their own cultural group’s norms as superior, and as a result they
exert pressure on the other party to adopt their cultural protocols;
accordingly, the other side resists assimilation and insists on its own
cultural norms and values.83 The tension in the EDL negotiations
resulting from each culture’s insistence on its own choice of language exemplifies the conflict created by ethnocentrism84 in international deals.
The language dispute with the national government is insignificant compared to the cultural battles Disney waged with the local
municipality. Disney’s decision to bypass the local governments
and negotiate directly with the state meant that the Marne-la-Vallée officials were not called to the negotiating table at all, and were
completely excluded from the process.85 The national government
demanded the municipalities’ total and immediate cooperation to
accommodate Disney but made no attempt to consult local officials, and the communes in turn felt betrayed by the state.86 The
local governments decried the state’s seizure and sale of land as a
violation of the spirit of France’s expropriation law.87 They also
protested the state’s indifference to the inevitable environmental
harm the Resort’s construction would cause to the farming re79 See Janis Forman, Corporate Image and the Establishment of Euro Disney: Mickey Mouse
and the French Press, 7 TECHNICAL COMM. Q. 247, 255 (1998).
80 The Swiss Family Treehouse is a climbable tree house in the Magic Kingdom based on the
Disney film Swiss Family Robinson. See Attractions at Walt Disney World Resort, WALT DISNEY
WORLD, http://disneyworld.disney.go.com/attractions/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) [hereinafter
Attractions].
81 Main Street, U.S.A. is the main walkway, lined with shops and restaurants, in the Magic
Kingdom. See id. Big Thunder Mountain Railroad is a roller coaster-type attraction designed as
a runaway mine train, located in the Magic Kingdom. See id.
82 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
83 BRETT, supra note 11, at 142.
84 Ethnocentrism refers to the “belief that your culture’s way of doing something is the best
way.” Id. at 235.
85 Forman, supra note 79, at 250.
86 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 24.
87 Id. at 25. France’s expropriation law allowed seizure of land for a military base, railroad,
or nuclear power station. Invoking it to accommodate EDL was, at best, a generous interpretation of the law, which some considered to be ironic in a country professing belief in “justice for
all.” See id.
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gion.88 Thus, Disney’s choice not to negotiate with the communal
governments laid the groundwork for hostile relationships between
Euro Disney and the domestic constituencies.
B.

Negotiations with Outside Firms and
Intraorganizational Employees

Theoretically, one way for a foreign private firm to maintain
positive relations with the host country is to involve as many local
managers in the venture as possible.89 Disney worked toward this
end by collaborating with local businesses and by employing
French people at the Resort, but these efforts failed to achieve the
desired harmony. Disney contracted with more than seven hundred French and European construction firms to build EDL.90 The
American company assumed that the crisis-prone European construction industry would welcome the new business, particularly
given Disney’s willingness to source almost all of the materials locally.91 In reality, construction in the Marne Valley was fraught
with discord. A main source of tension was Disney’s insistence on
contracting to build EDL according to American construction standards.92 As one French construction official remarked, “It was
pure stupidity to work with Disney. . . . The way the contract was
drawn up, according to ‘American Standards,’ we were never in the
right. . . . So we gave up. Signing with Disney was a big mistake.”93
Protesting against the American standards and threatening to
block EDL’s opening, sixteen European construction firms filed a
lawsuit against Euro Disney to collect on $170 million allegedly
inevitable cost overruns.94 This dispute reveals the added challenges posed by international contracting—no contract perfectly
captures the parties’ understanding in such a way as to prevent disputes, and international contracts are particularly imperfect because of the parties’ difficulties in interpreting each other’s intent.95
Moreover, as illustrated by the fact that Disney had to pay the con88 See Forman, supra note 79, at 251. One local farmer’s sign read: “Mickey, go home! Look
at our fields and villages. A monster is at the gates.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
89 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 163.
90 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
94 Id. Euro Disney deemed this suit “[p]lain blackmail.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
95 SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 179–180.
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struction firms a settlement,96 enforcement mechanisms in international deals tend to be less certain or more costly than in domestic
bargains.97 Rather than continue intercultural negotiations in the
construction process, Disney brought in American Imagineers98 to
take over the job. Executive vice president of Imagineering
Mickey Steinberg explained the choice: “[O]ur own people are the
only ones who have the expertise we need to get this park built.”99
Thus, Disney chose to pursue its alternatives rather than to repair
the international negotiation’s broken relationships.
In addition to Euro Disney’s challenges with the local construction firms, the company faced obstacles in the intercultural negotiations involved in training French employees (or as Disney
calls them, “Cast Members”100) and working with them at the Resort. Robert Fitzpatrick was officially president of Euro Disney,
but unofficially was a “goodwill ambassador” to the French Cast
Members.101 He held a doctorate in French literature and was
married to a French woman; he had also been acknowledged by the
press for his fluency in French.102 Disney’s choice of Francophile
Fitzpatrick for that position was an acknowledgment of the
French’s tendency to respond coolly to well-intentioned, but poorly
executed efforts to speak their language, and their preference that
foreigners not try at all.103 Disney strategically selected an American well-versed in French culture to lead the Euro Disney initiative
in hopes that he could bridge the Resort’s intraorganizational cultural gaps.
In the twelve months prior to opening EDL, Euro Disney
hired, housed, and trained 12,000 Cast Members.104 Euro Disney
96

Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
Id.
98 Imagineers are employees of Disney’s Walt Disney Imagineering unit, which designs and
develops new Park concepts and attractions as well as Resorts. See Annual Report, supra note 2,
at 8.
99 EISNER, supra note 4, at 282 (internal quotation omitted).
100 See Diversity, DISNEYLAND PARIS, http://disneylandparis-casting.com/en/who-we-are/let-stalk-about-company/diversity (last visited Feb. 18, 2013). As used herein, “Cast Members” refers to all Park employees, from costumed characters to groundskeepers.
101 Forman, supra note 79, at 248.
102 Id.
103 CHARLES COGAN, FRENCH NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: DEALING WITH LA GRANDE NATION 241 (2003). This preference may not hold true in the extreme case, such as the one
presented by Jim Cora. As Eisner described him, Cora was “blunt, no-nonsense, and so defiantly American that he refused to learn more than a few words of French during his seven years
in Paris.” EISNER, supra note 4, at 276. Such ethnocentrism as Cora’s reinforces cultural differences. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
104 Bakos, supra note 30, at 102.
97
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paid 10% over the market average to attract high quality personnel.105 It hired only bilingual and trilingual employees, who all
were required to speak French and English, EDL’s two official languages.106 Many of them had never seen a Disney Park before, so
Euro Disney’s first challenge was to communicate Disney’s vision
to them. Disney has a distinctive and well-established corporate
identity, which it perpetuates by training its employees rigorously
for Disney employment and by educating them about Disney culture.107 David Kanally, a Disney executive for twelve years and a
fluent French speaker, introduced the Cast Members to Disney’s
corporate philosophy by teaching them its history and its focus on
integrating hospitality and show business, as well as teamwork,
leadership, and various other job-specific topics.108
Disney’s approach in providing this training was theoretically
correct in some aspects. International negotiation theory advises
beginning international negotiations by exchanging information
that helps the parties to understand each other’s culture.109 Arguably, Disney attempted to develop a relationship with its French
Cast Members by educating them about the company, and by helping them to understand their new business partner and what they
could expect from Disney employment.110 Moreover, Disney’s
standards created a common culture among the diverse staff, which
some organizational experts cite as a contributing factor to harmonious relations within multinational organizations.111
105

Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.

106

Bakos, supra note 30, at 102.

107

See LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 95–97. The Disney training program occurs at “Disney
University.” Id. at 95. In their two-day training program entitled “Traditions,” new hires learn
Disney culture through films, worksheets, and team-building exercises. All Cast Members receive reference guides. Id. At France’s Disney University, “Le Guide du Cast Member” explained each Cast Member’s “role in the show,” “La Courtoisie Selon Disney” outlined
guidelines for verbal and nonverbal communication and guest service, and “The Euro Disney
Look” detailed Disney’s rules for Cast Member appearance. Id. at 96 (quotation marks omitted). These manuals instigated intra-organizational discord (see infra notes 112–127 and accompanying text), but Disney defended them as way of preserving the Park’s “carefully planned
setting and ambience of an on-stage area . . . with each cast member playing a supporting role.”
Id. at 97 (internal quotation omitted).
108

Bakos, supra note 30, at 102.

109

BRETT, supra note 11, at 144.

110

See Robert L. Kahn, Organizational Theory, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: ANALYAPPROACHES, ISSUES 159, 187 (Victor A Kremenyuk ed., 2002). Kahn refers to this as the
process of fostering “knowledge-based” trust—trust that is based on ability to understand the
other party’s interests and to predict his actions. See id.
SIS,

111

See, e.g., BRETT, supra note 11, at 146.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\15-1\CAC106.txt

unknown

Seq: 16

28-OCT-13

11:58

208 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 15:193
However, the recommended cultural introduction and the
communication of interests are intended to be bilateral. Disney’s
unilateral cultural indoctrination better exemplifies the common
mistake of becoming ideologically positional,112 rather than engaging in a mutually respectful process of exchange. Disney did not
communicate with Cast Members in such a way that encouraged
Disney to adapt to the local environment.113 Instead, it imposed
the Disney culture on the French one, thereby assuming its way
was the “right” way, and the host culture’s customs were “wrong”
or “unacceptable.”114 Not surprisingly, the French were unreceptive to this assertion.
Euro Disney’s problems magnified when it attempted to implement Disney’s codes of conduct, which differed markedly from
French labor practices. All French employment laws and regulations are codified in the Code du travail.115 Each industry is governed by master collective agreements, which regulate working
hours, wages, and conditions. Management is visibly hierarchical
and emphasizes individual self-reliance as opposed to integrative
teamwork and delegation,116 both of which Disney emphasizes.
Given the highly regulated nature of French labor and employment, Disney’s expectation that its American employment practices would translate into the French system was shortsighted, and
it resulted in a backlash.117 The Disney credo is “We work while
others have fun,”118 which for Disney particularly means the peak
tourist periods, including summers. Requiring Cast Members to
work during the summer months contravened French employment
practices concerning employee holidays and overtime compensation.119 Moreover, French labor leaders referred to Disney’s appearance codes as “repressive.”120 Disney’s prohibitions against
112

See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 119.
Dupont, supra note 62, at 121.
114 See BRETT, supra note 11, at 160. This strategy is diametrically opposed to one that would
foster “identification-based trust”—trust that rests upon identification with the other party’s
desires, intentions, and values—which is an essential element in harmonious intra-organizational
relations. See Kahn, supra note 110, at 187.
115 GORDON, supra note 37, at 48.
116 See id. at 137.
117 See Forman, supra note 79, at 251.
118 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
119 Id.
120 Alan Riding, Only the French Elite Scorn Mickey’s Debut, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1992, at
A13. The Disney codes mandate for women natural looking hair, only one ring per hand, minimal makeup, earrings smaller than 2 cm in diameter, short nails, heels between 2-10 cm high,
skirts 8 cm above the knee, and “appropriate undergarments.” Men are required to have well
113

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\15-1\CAC106.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 17

MICKEY GOES TO FRANCE

28-OCT-13

11:58

209

Cast Members’ smoking, eating, or drinking publicly and against
arguing with guests or using foul language121 were similarly decried
by the press and French legal authorities.122 The media accused
Disney of trying to “rewrite the French employment code,” and the
French Ministry of Employment deemed Disney’s approach to regulating appearance and behavior “an awkward policy, directly
transposed from the United States, which is poorly integrated into
French culture.”123
Faced with this cultural gap in employment norms, the French
reacted in defense of their own culture,124 which manifested itself
in acts of rebellion. The union struck, accusing the Euro Disney
police force of “spying” on Cast Members and of subjecting supervisors to daily searches.125 One thousand Cast Members left EDL
in the first three months.126 Those who stayed failed to meet even
Disney’s lowest standards of guest relations policy—Cast Members
who were asked to take group photos purposefully cut guests’
heads from the pictures; ride attendants charged entrance fees for
attractions because guests did not know they were free; and, perhaps most egregiously flouting Disney’s family focus, Cast Members costumed as Disney characters stared down children and
refused to give them autographs.127
The difficulty integrating American business practices into
French employment was more fundamental than conflicting labor
codes—the two cultures approach guest relations differently. In
France, unbridled enthusiasm is not a prominent—or desirable—
groomed hair above the collar and only one ring per hand, to be clean shaven, and to conceal
tattoos. Id. (quotation marks omitted); Forman, supra note 79, at 251–252; LAINSBURY, supra
note 14, at 96.
121 Forman, supra note 79, at 252.
122 See, e.g., id at 252–253.
123 Id. at 252 (internal quotation omitted). Euro Disney’s vice president of personnel Thorolf
Degelmann explained the policies as intended to create a “conservative, professional look; we
want our employees to be warm, outgoing, and sincere. We don’t want our guests to be distracted by oddities or mannerisms of the cast members.” LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 96 (internal quotation omitted).
124 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 114.
125 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1. These searches were conducted because of widespread
theft by Cast Members. As one EDL source put it, Cast Members were “taking home everything imaginable,” including $170,000 from the Hotel New York. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The EDL police force was a source of conflict in itself, as French police contested Euro
Disney’s right to deny the French jurisdiction and to maintain its own private, plainclothes force.
Id.
126 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.
127 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 107.
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feature of customer service.128 Accordingly, and perhaps predictably, many of the French Cast Members refused to become “Disneyfied,”129 and to follow Disney’s guest-relations protocols.
Unfortunately for Euro Disney, the guests were disappointed by
the Cast Members’ attitudes,130 which undermined the familiar image of Disney that guests developed during past experiences at its
Parks.131 Such damage to its corporate image was precisely the
eventuality against which Disney had hoped to guard by training
Cast Members in Disney culture.
In Euro Disney’s defense, it was perhaps not wholly at fault in
attempting to employ its American parent company’s standards. A
significant part of the package that the French government purchased was the Disney image. Disney purposefully provided the
same nature and quality of experience at each of its California,
Florida, and Tokyo Resorts, and to expect it to do otherwise because the French were unreceptive to the Disney model is perhaps
unfair. Instead of criticizing Disney for adhering to its corporate
practices, which were by no means secret when negotiations with
France began, it might be more accurate to say that Disney should
have conducted sufficient research into French labor practices to
understand that its model would conflict with French norms.
Rather than select its locale based largely on the host government’s
financial offer, Disney perhaps should have selected the location
into which it would integrate most smoothly.

C.

Negotiations with the Guests

Euro Disney’s difficulties with its French employees foreshadowed the cultural obstacles EDL faced in its initial interactions
with the French guests. One EDL official summed up the situation
poignantly: “After our successful encounter with Japan’s highly
complex culture, we thought we’d be able to open a Disney Park in
128

Id. at 106.
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
130 See id.
A British journalist remarked that the Cast Members were “mostly, nice
enough. . . . ‘Mostly,’ because even on opening weekend some clearly couldn’t care less. . . . My
overwhelming impression of the employees was that they were out of their depth.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted).
131 One American tourist lamented the shattered illusion: “Most of the workers are simply
not aiming to please. . . . They are playing a different game than their American counterparts.
They are acting like real people instead of ‘Disney’ people.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
129
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any part of the world—that is, until we arrived in France.”132 It is
essential to international ventures’ success that the visiting firm
foster a positive local identity and public image.133 Euro Disney’s
near bankruptcy is arguably attributable to Disney’s failure from
the outset of EDL’s construction to win popular favor in France.
Disney began the construction process without empathizing
with, or even fully understanding, the importance the Marne Valley
populace placed on agricultural traditions.134 Disney assumed the
French, who suffered from widespread unemployment, would
gladly accept Disney jobs, even though the employment markedly
differed from the area’s traditional industries.135 In this way, Disney erred by engaging in ethnocentric thinking: It considered the
local populace’s preference for agricultural tradition over industrial
development to be irrational because the community needed work,
and it assumed its assessment of the region’s best interests was superior to that of the local citizens.136 Opting to try to persuade the
locals to give up their lifestyle, Disney determined the balance of
values favored the American pro-development position, and made
no attempt to win community support by preserving the region’s
agricultural traditions.137 Because it discounted the French people’s preferences as irrational, Disney displayed a lack of respect
for the French culture.138
In reaction to Disney’s ethnocentrism, the French quickly rejected Disney. French intellectuals lambasted Euro Disneyland.
Writer Jean Cau called EDL “a horror made of cardboard, plastic
and appalling colors, a construction of hardened chewing gum and
idiotic folklore taken straight out of comic books written for obese
132

Michaud, supra note 43, at *1 (internal quotation omitted).
See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 163.
134 See Dupont, supra note 62, at 381–382 (noting that lacking empathy and sufficient knowledge of the host country is one of the most common errors international negotiators make).
135 See BRETT, supra note 11, at 8.
136 See id. at 8, 160. Treating the other countrymen as second-class citizens by rejecting their
ideas reinforces cultural differences. See id. at 160.
137 See id. at 9.
138 French Ambassador Gérard Errera considers a show of respect to be the key to negotiating with the French. See COGAN, supra note 103, at 125. The French culture has been characterized as demonstrating simultaneous superiority (“la Grand Nation”) and inferiority (“culture of
the underdog”) complexes, which makes the French particularly sensitive to perceived disrespect. See id. at 13–14 (quotation marks omitted). These competing influences predispose the
French to be wary of giving in easily to foreigners, and reinforce their desire to be treated as a
stronger negotiating partner’s equal. Id. at 14. Thus, Disney’s failure to show respect for the
French cultural traditions exemplifies the type of interaction with Americans that “only confirms
for the French that Americans are ignorant of the central role France has played” in international affairs. Id. at 15 (internal quotation omitted).
133
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Americans.”139 Others echoed Cau’s sentiments, referring to EDL
as “a terrifying giant’s step toward world homogenization,” and expressing hope for “a May 1992 that will set fire to Euro Disneyland.”140 To an extent, the intellectuals’ comments simply reflect a
degree of anti-Americanism in French society.141 More subtly, they
reveal the fear that American (and Disney) cultural imperialism
would succeed in altering French society because the French citizens would actively embrace American norms.142 In response, the
intellectuals espoused French nationalist ideology as a defensive
posture, and rejected Disney as a threat to their perceived national
interests.143
Despite French critics’ excoriations, Disney made some goodfaith efforts to earn acceptance in Europe. Eisner spent part of the
summer of 1988 in France meeting with European managers and
developing relationships with them, seeking to understand French
people’s everyday interests and patterns.144 Disney also carefully
contemplated the best approach to take in packaging EDL for the
French people. Disney did not simply import its American Resorts
into France, as it had in Tokyo. Imagineering executive Tony Baxter, who designed Disneyland Park, explained, “We’re building a
resort next to one of the most sophisticated, cultured cities in the
world, and we’re going to be competing with the great art and architecture of Europe. We have to do something unique.”145 Disney executives agreed that the French Resort would require more
sophistication and attention to artistic detail than was present even
in Disney’s other meticulously designed Resorts.146 But rather
than “take Mickey Mouse and try to do surgery to create a transmogrified hybrid, half French and half American,”147 Disney instead aspired to build its Disneyland Park in a way that paid tribute
to the local influences but remained thoroughly American.
Achieving this goal meant emphasizing throughout Disneyland Park the fact that many Disney characters, including Cinderella and Peter Pan, originated in European fables. These
139

Riding, supra note 120, at A1 (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at A13 (quoting writers Jacques Julliard and Alain Finkelkraut) (internal quotation
omitted).
141 See COGAN, supra note 103, at 42.
142 See Forman, supra note 79, at 249. See also Riding, supra note 120, at A13.
143 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 119–120.
144 EISNER, supra note 4, at 273, 275.
145 Id. at 270 (quotation marks omitted).
146 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 54.
147 Greenhouse, supra note 25, at C3 (internal quotation omitted).
140
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characters received more prominence in EDL than in the domestic
Parks, and where possible, Disney called them by their French
names (e.g., Sleeping Beauty was “La belle au bois dormant”).148
Similarly, Disney adapted the domestic Parks’ Tomorrowland149 to
become EDL’s Discoveryland, in which the American company
celebrated famous Europeans from history, such as Jules Verne,
Leonardo da Vinci, and H.G. Wells.150 Further, employing a recognized relationship building technique,151 Disney continually emphasized Walt Disney’s ancestral French roots and time served in
France as a World War I ambulance driver.152 Moreover, Disney
tried to adapt the Resort’s menus to the European palate by inviting six hundred restaurants to submit ideas and recipes—based on
these suggestions, it made changes such as refining its Tex-Mex recipes to be less spicy, and developing a new coffee blend that would
appeal more to Europeans.153 Further, when market research revealed Europeans’ strong association of the United States with the
Wild West, and in light of the French’s love of cowboys from frontier dramas, Disney responded by importing Frontierland154 from
the domestic Parks to France.155
Notwithstanding these attempts to adapt to its new locale, Disney largely failed to penetrate the French market. To succeed in
business in France, a company must fully understand French taste
and the market’s regional nature—individual pockets of population demand individual agents and attention.156 Disney erred because it treated Europe as a homogenous market;157 it did not
recognize that European tourists’ habits vary greatly by country.158
It also made the mistake of advertising EDL in Europe using methods developed in the United States. The original ad campaigns
targeted children and featured Mickey or Pluto introducing the
148

Forman, supra note 79, at 250.
Tomorrowland is a section of the Magic Kingdom with future and space-themed rides and
attractions. See generally Magic Kingdom, supra note 32.
150 Riding, supra note 120, at A13. The technique of paying special tribute to France’s historical achievements is one that Cogan recommends to American negotiators as a way of according
France respect. See COGAN, supra note 103, at 239–241.
151 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 48.
152 Riding, supra note 120, at A13.
153 Bakos, supra note 30, at 98.
154 Frontierland is a section of the Magic Kingdom with American West-themed rides and
attractions. See generally Magic Kingdom, supra note 32.
155 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 57.
156 GORDON, supra note 37, at 158.
157 See Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.
158 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
149

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\15-1\CAC106.txt

unknown

Seq: 22

28-OCT-13

11:58

214 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 15:193
rides and parades available inside the Park.159 This technique
worked in the U.S. because adults there had visited Disney Resorts
as children, but European adults associated Disney with
magazines, films, and toys, not with a vacation trip; consequently,
Europeans thought the advertised “theme park” was just an overpriced fair.160 Thus, Disney’s negotiation mistake was cultural stereotyping, insofar as it treated all Europe as a whole rather than as
individual regions with varying interests.161
Moreover, Disney vastly overestimated the relative value
Europeans would place on EDL admission, food, and lodging. The
admission charge in 1991 dollars was $40 for adults and $27 for
children under 11.162 After the September 1992 collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism, it became 10-20% more expensive for
some European tourists to visit, and attendance declined by as
much as 50% in the affected countries.163 Currency fluctuations
are a risk inherent in every international deal.164 But rather than
adapt to the currency devaluation by lowering prices, Euro Disney
maintained the current levels. Prices were so high in the Resort
that guests began smuggling in their own food and drink to compensate for the admission charges.165 Euro Disney did not even
decrease the hotel room prices, notwithstanding the fact that from
the outset it was charging more than market research suggested
was appropriate.166 Accordingly, guests opted to stay in Paris and

159

Id.
Id.
161 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 111.
162 Riding, supra note 120, at A13.
163 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.
164 SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 179–180.
165 Peter Curwen, Euro Disney: The Mouse That Roared (not!), 95 EUR. BUS. REV. 15, 17
(1995). Guests may not bring outside food and beverages into the Parks at EDL. See FAQ,
DISNEYLAND PARIS, http://us.disneylandparis.com/faq/index.xhtml?# (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
Disney permits guests to bring outside food and beverages into the Parks at Walt Disney World,
but not at Disneyland. See Disney Theme Parks & Water Parks—Frequently Asked Questions,
WALT DISNEY WORLD, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/faq/parks/outside-food-and-drink/
(last visited Mar. 2, 2013); see also FAQ: Dining, DISNEYLAND RESORT, http://disneyland.disney.
go.com/faq/dining/#dining-q5 (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
166 See EISNER, supra note 4, at 280. Disney executives increased hotel prices in 1989 above
the initial plan because they determined the rooms’ quality and amenities made it reasonable to
charge an extra $20-30/night. Eisner refers to the added construction costs from additional
amenities and the resulting rental price increases as a “self-perpetuating cycle of enthusiasm and
optimism.” Id.
160
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commute to the Resort, rather than pay EDL’s inflated hotel
rates.167
Its initial efforts to please the French palate aside, perhaps the
clearest example of Disney’s misunderstanding French culture is
the way it approached food and beverage throughout EDL. Disney incorrectly assumed that the French would want only croissants
and coffee for breakfast in the hotels, and was wholly unprepared
when it turned out they wanted full, seated breakfasts.168 And
while the food was supposedly better in EDL than at Disney’s
other Resorts,169 the menus were too complicated and pricey for
guests who wanted quick service meals in lieu of France’s traditional, sit-down repasts.170 But Euro Disney’s greatest offense was
its decision to uphold Disney’s then-longstanding policy of prohibiting alcohol in the Magic Kingdom.171 For the French, who view
wine as an important part of everyday life, the alcohol ban exemplified the American company’s incompatibility with—and insensitivity to— French culture.172 These instances demonstrate Disney’s
failure to ascertain the true interests of its negotiating partners, the
French guests. Disney made assumptions where it should have
asked questions, with the result that the French did not welcome
the Resort’s construction from the outset, and were not won over
during the initial operating period.
Arguably, the most significant factor in Disney’s failure to find
favor with the French people was its arrogance. The interviews in
Le Figaro Economique quoted Euro Disney executives making
such comments as “There is a world of difference between Disney
and others. . . . There is Disney, Disney, Disney, Disney and the
others. We are already the best.”173 In a country filled with beautiful, historic castles, the Americans were claiming, “We’re building
something immortal, like the pharaohs built the pyramids.”174 Dis167 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309. As a result, EDL’s initial hotel occupancy averaged only 55%. Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 EISNER, supra note 4, at 283.
171 Id. In this instance, “Magic Kingdom” refers generally to the Magic Kingdom at Walt
Disney World, Disneyland Park at Disneyland, and Tokyo Disneyland at Tokyo Disney. Disney
has now broken from that policy at Be Our Guest Restaurant, located in the Magic Kingdom at
Walt Disney World, which serves wine and beer. See Be Our Guest Restaurant: Menu, WALT
DISNEY WORLD, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/dining/magic-kingdom/be-our-guest-restau
rant/menus/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
172 See Riding, supra note 120, at A13.
173 EISNER, supra note 4, at 281 (internal quotation omitted).
174 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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ney came to France convinced its success was assured. Perceiving
itself as the stronger negotiator, it failed to reach out to the party
across the table. And for a culture that yearns for recognition of its
international importance,175 such arrogance as Disney displayed
could only lead to one conclusion: The French guests ended negotiations, and Euro Disney nearly went bankrupt.176

D. Renegotiation: Mickey Takes French Lessons
After a year of troubled interactions with the French people,
Disney then “reopened” negotiations by endeavoring to correct its
mistakes. First, Disney learned that an American fluent in French
is still an American. Despite his connections with the French culture, Fitzpatrick failed to bridge the cultural gap as Euro Disney
president and (later) chairman,177 arguably because the French can
“never really be comfortable with foreigners who are not fully assimilated.”178 So, in 1993, Euro Disney appointed Philippe
Bourguignon, a Frenchman, to succeed Fitzpatrick as the new
chairman and charged him with overcoming the cultural disconnect.179 Bourguignon responded to his task by fostering dialogue
with the Cast Members. Between 1994 and 1996 he had breakfast
with the staff twice a week to learn from them how he could improve the Resort.180 Under Bourguignon, Euro Disney also
adapted its work practices to become more French—it recognized
standard French employee classifications, set a maximum work
week, and annualized hourly work schedules.181 The combination
of soliciting the Cast Members’ opinions and creating a more traditionally French workplace greatly improved intraorganizational
relations.
Having negotiated successfully with the Cast Members,
Bourguignon next sought to win the French guests’ favor by dem175

See supra note 138.
See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
177 Fitzpatrick was named Euro Disney’s chairman in 1992 when Philippe Bourguignon was
appointed as its president. E. Tempest, French Dip: With Attendance Lagging, Euro Disney will
Step up Marketing in France, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at 2.
178 COGAN, supra note 103, at 126 (internal quotation omitted).
179 Bourguignon succeeded Fitzpatrick as chairman effective April 12, 1993. James Bates,
When in France, Do as the French: Euro Disney: Theme Park Operator, in Apparent Response to
Soft Attendance, Elevates a Native Son to Chairman, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, at 1.
180 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
181 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 136.
176
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onstrating awareness of their interests and priorities. This meant
cutting prices: He slashed Park admission for adults in the high season by 20%, offered numerous special promotions in the winter
months, and reduced the cost of the least expensive hotel rooms by
a third.182 Moreover, Bourguignon gave Paris-area residents a special 30% admission discount.183 Under the Frenchman’s command,
advertising for EDL changed its focus to target adults—new ads
depicted parents’ responses to seeing their children’s happiness
and groups of adults sitting tensely before riding Space Mountain:
Mission 2.184 Euro Disney also began tailoring its promotions to
individual national markets. Between 1994 and 1996 it opened offices in London, Frankfurt, Milan, Brussels, Amsterdam, and Madrid, each of which customized vacation packages for the regional
audience.185
Further, Bourguignon strove to correct the American company’s misperceptions of French consumption habits. Rather than
the “tastefully embroidered” merchandise that Euro Disney had
been selling (assuming European guests would prefer apparel more
like the designer goods they typically purchased), Euro Disney
started vending the same unapologetically cartoonish shirts, hats,
and backpacks that Disney sells in America.186 Bourguignon also
encouraged Euro Disney to revamp EDL’s well-intentioned, but
inappropriate menus, declaring, “people do not come to the park
for a gastronomic experience.”187 Euro Disney executives eventually realized that trying to recreate Europe’s epicurean culture at
the Resort was a mistake: “We know that Americans don’t want us
to open a French restaurant in New York or Los Angeles that
serves a double patty cheeseburger . . . and that the French don’t
want us to come over there and do crepes. . . . They want us to do
what we do.”188 Even so, Euro Disney also demonstrated a willingness to accommodate its new locale by departing from its normal
182

The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.
184 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67. Space Mountain: Mission 2 is
an attraction in Disneyland Park that features a “supercharged canon” [sic] that takes guests on
a “warp-speed ride into the unknown.” Discoveryland: Attractions: Space Mountain: Mission 2,
DISNEYLAND PARIS, http://us.parks.disneylandparis.com/disneyland-park/lands/discoveryland/at
tractions/space-mountain-mission2.xhtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). Space Mountain: Mission 2
is similar to Space Mountain at Walt Disney World. See Attractions, supra note 80.
185 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
186 Id.
187 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
188 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 134 (quoting Michael Eisner) (internal quotation omitted).
183
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practices—it broke from Disney’s longstanding policy and allowed
alcohol into Disneyland Park.189
Euro Disney began to understand that the European guests
came to EDL to experience Disney, not Disney’s version of Europe. And EDL began to win the guests’ favor because it started
responding to the desires they expressed, rather than forcing upon
them what it assumed they wanted. Some of these changes seem
comparatively small, such as an increase in morning room service
to compensate for the shortage of available breakfast seating.190
Others reveal a greater level of empathy, such as the Resort’s
newly created festivities for European holidays like Bastille Day
and Oktoberfest.191 But perhaps the most telling of Euro Disney’s
active attempts to improve intercultural relations was Euro Disneyland’s October 1, 1994 official renaming to “Disneyland
Paris.”192 Eisner offered this insight into the decision to rename
EDL: “As Americans, we had believed that the word ‘Euro’ in
front of Disney was glamorous and exciting. For Europeans, it
turned out to be a term they associated with business, currency,
and commerce. Renaming the park ‘Disneyland Paris’ was a way
of identifying it not just with Walt’s original creation but with one
of the most romantic and exciting cities in the world.”193 With this
decision, Disney finally did what an international negotiator should
do: It cast off its stereotypes and assumptions, investigated and empathized with its counterparty’s interests, and reached a mutually
acceptable, culturally integrative solution.
IV.

CONCLUSION: ADVICE

ON

EXPANDING

THE

EMPIRE

Looking back on the EDL venture, one wizened Euro Disney
official commented, “If we had to do it over again . . . we’d probably think twice—not only about setting up shop in France, but
about our approach to exporting Disney abroad altogether.”194
Contrasted with the widespread optimism expressed prior to the
Resort’s opening,195 this remark raises the question whether the
Disney model can—and should—be integrated into cultures vastly
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
See LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 134.
Id. at 132.
See supra note 6.
EISNER, supra note 4, at 292.
Michaud, supra note 43, at *1 (internal quotation omitted).
See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
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different from the American one in which it was developed. Disney’s experiences prior to EDL argue that Disney has truly universal appeal. Disneyland and Walt Disney World both attract visitors
from across the globe, and Tokyo Disney is an undisputed success.196 But with Disney’s Parisian experience to demonstrate its
fallibility, and in light of its recently-opened Resort in Hong Kong
and soon-to-open Resort in Shanghai,197 it is appropriate to query
whether the Disney image really is a global commodity. The answer to this question could be “yes” if Disney hones its intercultural negotiation techniques. Though directed particularly at
Disney, the following advice is relevant for any multinational firm.
For Disney to succeed in global operations, it must avoid cultural stereotypes. It must base decisions on what it learns about
other cultures, not what it assumes about them. As the successful
appointment of Philippe Bourguignon as head of Euro Disney
demonstrates, Disney should rely upon cultural natives to educate
it about what will succeed in the host culture. The implications of
this statement extend beyond mere market research—bestowing
real decision-making power on members of the local culture will
enable Disney to make the most culturally-appropriate decisions.
Disney must also strike a balance between adapting to the
host environment and sacrificing its corporate identity. While the
alcohol ban, for example, was a longstanding Disney policy,198 it
was also an ethnocentric one: Deeming alcoholic beverages to be
not “family-friendly” is arguably inappropriate in a society that
seamlessly integrates alcohol into family life. When faced with
such cultural gaps, Disney should reevaluate its policies and determine whether they are actually fundamental to its corporate image,
or merely fundamental to its corporate image in the United States,
based on what the American culture deems appropriate. Those adaptations that do not undermine what is essentially “Disney”
should be made in the name of cultural integration. Making concessions that are not truly adverse to Disney’s interests helps to
bridge the cultural gap, and allows Disney to stand firm in negotiating those issues that really do implicate its values.
Finally, Disney should negotiate with awareness that even it, a
veritable empire, is fallible. A modicum of humility will serve Disney better than the abundance of bravado that Disney executives
196

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
Hong Kong Disneyland opened on September 12, 2005. Annual Report, supra note 2 at
11. Shanghai Disney Resort is currently targeted to open during the calendar year 2015. Id.
198 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
197

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\15-1\CAC106.txt

unknown

Seq: 28

28-OCT-13

11:58

220 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 15:193
exhibited in the EDL negotiations. Disney should focus on offering the high quality products and experiences the world has come
to love, but should also recognize that such love—and the profits
that accompany it—must be earned and deserved. Michael Eisner
urged Disney officials to adopt the attitude of “[w]e will try hard
and we hope you will like us.”199 Though Disney has rejected Eisner’s leadership,200 to succeed in its international negotiations, Disney should embrace his refrain.

199

EISNER, supra note 4, at 281 (quotation marks omitted).
See Laura M. Holson, A Quiet Departure for Eisner at Disney, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005,
at C6 (noting Eisner was “stripped of his chairman’s title” in 2004 after a “shareholder revolt”
and ultimately left Disney in 2005).
200

